Memorandum

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE
KYEEMAGH-CHULLORA ROAD

Commissioner: MR. D.S. KIRBY, B.A., LL.B.
Secretary:. MR. K.W. HARDY.

4th Floor, A.D.C. Building
99 Elizabeth Street,
SYDNEY. N.S.W. 2000,
Telephone: 233-5939.

16th April, 1981

K.W. Trott Esq.,
Under Secretary,
Ministry of Transport,
227 Elizabeth Street,
SYDNEY. N.S.W. 2000.

Dear Mr Trott,

RE: - CONTAINER REPORT (VOLUME I)

Thank you for the opportunity of addressing TRANSAC
on Monday last.

I enclose a memorandum in which I reiterate some of
the points made in the course of that discussion.

If TRANSAC takes the view that it cannot recommend
the scheme, I should value (on a confidential basis)
a copy of its report and recommendations, so that I
can carefully prepare my response.

Yours Sincerely,

D. S. KIRBY

MEMORANDUM

1. INDUSTRIAL IMPLICATIONS

1. For approximately one week prior to the 25-8-80
the Waterside Workers’ Federation was on strike. The
Port of Sydney was closed.

2. On the 25-8-80 a conference was arranged between
certain cabinet Ministers and the W.W.F. On that day
I telephoned the Minister for Transport, Mr. Cox. I
asked for a meeting. The meeting took place prior to
the conference with the union representatives.

3. The conference was attended by Mr. Ferguson,
Mr. Hills and Mr. Cox. It was also attended by Messrs
Gleeson, Trott and Wallace. I indicated that I had
mapped out (but not yet written) my Report. It touched
the matters which were the subject of the dispute. I
outlined my recommendations. The recommendations were
deliberately designed as a package. They were designed
to appease the legitimate industrial interests of all
unions involved i.e., the W.W.F./T.W.U., on the one hand,
and the Storeman and Packers Union on the other. I
would recommend one small depot at the port. That
recommendation would inevitably have repercussions
upon the depots at Villawood and Chullora. Those depots,
by way of compensation, and as part of the package, would
benefit under the scheme which I would recommend.

4. The Deputy Premier and Mr. Wallace were both
concerned to know the percentage of containers forced
to travel by rail under the scheme being suggested.
I indicated that 41% or thereabouts of the expected
throughput. That figure was not remarkably different
from the expected throughput of CTAL (36%) and the
throughput experienced by ANL since the Port’s
opening (28%).

5. The matter was put to Mr. Hills. He was asked
whether the scheme would placate the Storeman and
Packers Union. He responded by saying that the Union

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was "concerned about bodies". If the package would
save jobs, it may do the job.

6. The meeting concluded on the basis that Mr. Ferguson
would put the matter to the Waterside Workers' Federation.
The Federation went back to work the following day. It
is my understanding that the Deputy Premier explained
the package, and persuaded the Federation to defer
certain action which it had planned (designed to
establish a depot at the Port), pending the completion
of an Interim Report, which I was enjoined to provide
by the end of the week.

7. I furnished an Interim Report on schedule (29-8-80).
It contained the recommendations outlined in the
package. The Minister saw the Union the following
week. On my understanding the Union was content to
accept the package which included a depot at the Port
(6,000 TEU) as well as railing containers to the
Western Suburbs. Indeed, I gather the W.W.F. was
given a copy of the Interim Report.

8. The Storeman and Packers Union was also furnished
with a copy of the Interim Report. It responded by
calling a strike. It lasted well over one week.
My Inquiry was trenchantly criticised before the
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission for having
recommended a depot at the Port.

9. At the same time the Storeman and Packers' Union
furnished the Deputy Premier, Mr. Ferguson, with a
detailed response to the Interim Report (letter 27-10-80).
That response was given to me for comment. I prepared
a 12 page memorandum. That memorandum endeavoured to
dispell the fears of the Storeman and Packers' Union.
It examined the implications of the package. On the
one hand it was reasonable to anticipate that a
proportion of LCL containers would be subtracted from
the throughput of each Western Suburbs depot. That
would cost jobs. On the other hand those depots would
be given an additional number of FCL containers as part
of the scheme. The handling of those containers (though

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less labour intensive) would mean that there was no
nett loss of employment.

10. Whilst the union was still on strike the General
Secretary of the Storeman and Packers' Union, Mr.
Simon Crean, saw the Premier (or perhaps the Deputy
Premier). On my understanding the memorandum was
given to Mr. Crean. He, apparently, was persuaded to
accept the package. The union, thereafter, recommended
a return to work. The strike ended the following day.

11. There are three situations. They are each quite
different. It is one thing for the Government to
implement a policy which is inimical to the interests
of a particular union. Confrontation may be expected.
That, however, is in the nature of government. It is
another thing to reach a pact (or even a loose under-
standing) with a union and then to resile from that
understanding, and refuse its implementation. The
union may in that circumstance feel the more aggrieved.
The confrontation is liable to be the more bloody.

There is a third situation. The creation of a depot at
Botany is inimical to the interests of the Storeman and
Packers’ Union. Confrontation can be expected. Further,
having reached what appears to have been a loose under-
standing (if not a firm agreement) with the Union in
October last year, whereby the Union's interest would
be protected by the implementation of the scheme, the
failure to follow that course is liable to make the
confrontation, when it occurs, the more protracted and
bitter. There is a third element which should be added
to the mix. I have little doubt that the public wants
containers to go by rail. (See below). The Storeman
and Packers’ Union is liable to become the more
self-righteous in its confrontation with the Government
when it appreciates, as it must, that its cause
coincides with that of the public.

12. The depot issue had been running sore on the
waterfront for a number of years. It was such an
explosive issue that no-one dared speak about it,

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except in whispered tones, when my Inquiry first began.
I unashamedly endeavoured to put together a proposal
which would give everyone something and no-one every-
thing. At the same time it would serve the legitimate
interests of Government in preserving the environment,
preserving employment in the Western Suburbs, and
assisting the railways to retain a profitable trade.
In my respectful submission it is a little late in the
day, at this remove, to resile from the package. To
implement part only of the package would be seen,
rightly in my view, as a grave injustice to the party
whose acquiescence was obtained to the total concept
and not to part of it.

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2. A POPULAR SOLUTION

1. The statistics are familiar. They nonetheless
bear repeating. Some 1500 written submissions were
made to the Inquiry. Almost 3,000 people subscribed
to petitions. Some 180 people appeared at the public
hearings. The view was almost unanimous (see Report,
pages 50-56). ‘There is a clamour for the movement
of containers by rail which is all but deafening.'
(See page 52).

2. It may be said that this is an emotional response;
that it is not rational to single out large container
vehicles. I believe (see pages 21-38 of the Report)
that it is quite rational. But whether it is rational
or emotional, the response should not be doubted.

3. It may be said that the view put to the Inquiry
was that of a vociferous minority. I reject that
suggestion. Precisely the same view is reflected in
the submissions from each of the local councils namely:

• Botany Council
• The South Sydney Council
• The Marrickville Council
• The Rockdale Council
• The Canterbury Council
• The Kogarah Council
• The Hurstville Council

4. To that list (whose submissions appear in the
Report pages 53-55) may be added the following:

• The Burwood Council which had this to say:

"The option of satisfying the demand
for transport of goods and passengers
by upgrading and extension of railway
lines was not adequately investigated
by the DMR and PEC Report. This
option could constitute a viable
alternative, at least in part, to a
road link."

• The submission from the Bankstown Council was
  in the following terms:

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"A seventh option which received
little attention in the preliminary
report was the option providing no
new road but instead using existing
rail goods lines for passenger and
goods services.. It would seem that
this option would have many benefits
and Council supports wholeheartedly
the further investigation of such a
proposal. (It should be noted,
however, that it is considered
unlikely that such a rail provision
could wholly satisfy the need for
industrial transport of goods from
the Port area to the industrial areas
of Sydney).”

5. When every local council takes the same view as
private members of the public who bother to make a
written or oral submission, it is difficult to imagine
what further evidence (short of a referendum) one would
need in order to draw an inference that the public
perceive a problem, and perceive rail to be the solution
to that problem.

6. The early hearings were attended by the environmental
writer for the Sydney Morning Herald (Mr. Joseph Glascott).
His initial article is attached. He perceived precisely
the same message. It will be noticed that the headline
is in the following terms:

“RESIDENTS PLEAD FOR RAIL
Road Plan Draws Heavy Fire”

He should be awarded no marks for his perspicacity.
The message was loud and clear.

7. The Inquiry has not recommended the Western Suburbs
Scheme because it happens to be the popular view. It
recognises the important role an inquiry can play in
easing the passage of Government towards the adoption
of a necessary but unpopular measure. That was not this
case. In the Inquiry’s judgement the popular view was
also, happily, the correct view.

3. IS THERE AN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM?

1. I discerned some doubt that there would be an
environmental problem. The doubt, apparently, arises
from certain supplementary material provided by the
Study Group. I have not examined that material. I
assume it offers a lower estimate of the number of
trucks passing through Rockdale.

2. There can be no certainty on this issue. To make
any calculation one must make a number of assumptions.
Any one assumption may be wrong. Trucks may choose to
travel through Marrickville, rather than through
Rockdale.

3. However, in my view, it is beyond argument that
there will be a problem. I rely upon the following
matters in forming this view:

• The Simblist Inquiry in November, 1976
  diagnosed a problem. It recommended the
  compulsory despatch of containers (as to
  50%) by rail. That document was well
  received by the public (and by the
  Government).

• The S.P.C.C. in its Environmental Inquiry
  did not appear to doubt that there would be
  an environmental problem, though it took the
  view that it was outside the control of the
  container terminals. (See Container Report,
  pages 60 and 314).

• The Department of Environment and Planning
  thought the average number of trucks per
  day would be 512. The peak hour average
  would be 89. The Study Group took a more
  conservative view because it refused to
  make assumptions on matters which were
  essentially unknown (such as the number
  of empty trucks and so on). It put the
  number of trucks as lying between 250 and
  400. In a subsequent re-working of that
  calculation it apparently thought the number

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of loaded trucks would be something less
than that number.

• The container terminals themselves made
  certain calculations in their submission
  to the Simblist Inquiry. They are
  reproduced in the Container Report, page
  83. They estimated the number of trucks
  per day to be 640. They thought the
  average number per hour would be 64.
  Clearly that figure is understated.
  Container movements, by and large, are
  compressed into a 7-hour time span (between
  7.30 a.m. and 2.30 p.m.). The average is
  more than likely to be 90 per hour. Whilst
  these figures are based upon a throughput
  of 300,000 TEU p.a. which is slightly higher
  than the estimate for 1985 (273,000 TEU) , it
  really makes no difference. The throughput
  will rise to that level in 1986.

• Each of these figures effectively understates
  the problem. The maritime trade is afflicted
  by peaks and troughs. CTAL suggest that an
  appropriate factor for the peak is 1.5.
  (Report page 128). On the basis of the
  figures in the joint ANL/CTAL submission to
  the Simblist Inquiry (averaged over a 7-hour
  day rather than a 10-hour day) the hourly
  average would be 135 containers per hour.

• This is to be contrasted with the number
  at Mort Bay. The daily total at Mort Bay
  on the busiest road was 60 containers. The
  hourly average was 15 to 20 containers.
  (Report page 87). There are significant
  differences between Mort Bay, Balmain and
  Rockdale/Bexley. (Report page 86). Making
  due allowance for those differences, the
  environmental problem is still obvious.

• The problem will become the more unacceptable
  in the future as industry migrates to the
  West and South-West. The inner-city has

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only 22.1% of the industrial land. The
West and South-West has 58.5% (Report
page 75). As the industrial land in
the West and South-West is developed,
the number of containers will rise.

• The number will rise, in any event, with
  the effluxion of time. In 1985 418,000
  TEU are predicted. In 1989/90 529,000 TEU
  are predicted (Report page 63).

• Due allowance must be made for the impact
  which my Report will have upon the public
  mind. The Inquiry adopted the popular view.
  The Inquiry's judgement will reinforce the
  opinion, already widely held, that there is
  an environmental problem occasioned by the
  passage of containers, and there are means
  available to the Government by which it
  can be solved.

• Ordinarily a government can rely upon inertia
  and a certain apathy on the part of the public.
  On this issue it would be dangerous to assume
  that the public would not react. If the
  scheme were not implemented, the Storeman
  and Packers’ Union would be in a unique
  position to stir the caldron to bring
  discontent with the Government’s decision
  bubbling to the surface.

4. The committee’s recommendations in any event, seem
to me to involve a contradiction. On the one hand there
seems to be some doubt to whether there is a problem;
on the other there is a suggested road link which can
only be justified if in fact there is a problem.

5. The environmental impact occasioned by the carriage
of containers by rail is miniscule compared to the
carriage by road. This is a matter dealt with in
the Report (page 228-234).

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4. THE OPTIONS

1. Once it is conceded that there is a problem, or even
that the community perceives there is a problem, it becomes
necessary to examine the options. They are:-

• Do nothing (or defer any solution)
• A major road
• A ‘quick-fix’ minor road
• The scheme suggested by the Inquiry

2. I do not believe the do nothing option is available.
At least one of the depots in the Western Suburbs is
teetering on the verge of closure. Confrontation with the
Government by the Storemen and packers’ Union is inevitable.
The depot will remain open, pending the resolution of the
present issue. If it closes, its closure will be directly
attributable to a failure by the Government to implement
the scheme. Worse, it will be attributed by the union to
a failure to implement the package agreed in October 1980.

3. The major roads are not an option. They offer a
potential long-term solution to a problem which is rather
more immediate. On any view they would take 10 to 15 years
to construct, even were there sufficient funds available.
(See pages 43-46 of the Report).

5. A MINOR ROAD FROM TANCRED AVENUE, KYEEMAGH TO MARSH STREET,
   ARNCLIFFE

1. A minor road is not a realistic option in my judgement
The reasons emerge in my Report: -

•  Volume I‘Containers', pages 45-46

• Volume IV ‘The Options', pages 341-345

2. The unsuitability of that link can be demonstrated in a
number of ways:-

• It joins General Holmes Drive at a point
  where congestion is already severe. It
  may exacerbate that congestion.

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• The traffic must then use General
  Holmes Drive including the tunnel
  under the airport.

• It would channel traffic into Wickham
  Street, Forest Road and the Bexley
  Shopping Centre, substantially
  exacerbating problems already
  experienced at each of those locations.

3. Elaborating upon these arguments, the following can
be said:-

• The corridor from Tancred Avenue, Kyeemagh
  to the Princes Highway was established before
  the extension of the Airport into Botany Bay.
  There .was not then, as there is now, the
  problem of the tunnel under the Airport.

• It is proposed to convert the tunnel from
  six lanes to eight lanes. Each lane will be
  made more narrow. Whilst many roads in Sydney
  have narrow lanes, it is another thing where
  those lanes are within a tunnel. A tunnel, by
  its nature, is claustrophobic. With narrow
  lanes, and heavy concentration of container
  vehicles, it will intimidate other drivers to
  an unacceptable degree.

• The problem may become worse. The MANS Committee
  has recommended the extension of the runway into
  Botany Bay. If that view were to prevail the
  tunnel will, presumably, double in length.

• If a road is to be built servicing the Port it
  is important that it should cater for the traffic
  to which the Port gives rise. The recent decision
  to use vacant Port land for bulk fuel will
  generate tanker traffic. That traffic cannot
  use the tunnel. It could not, therefore, use
  the link road proposed.

• The 1978 URTAC Review by the Study Group identified
  a problem to which the construction of this link

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may give rise, namely the exacerbation of
congestion (already severe) where it joins
General Holmes Drive. (Report Volume IV page
343).

• It was evident from the modelling process that
  the proposed link on the southern side of the
  airport did not conform to the needs of motorists.
  The loadings on the link were very light.
  Traffic generally wished to make its way to the
  north of the airport rather than the south. For
  this, amongst other, reasons the Department of
  Main Roads, the Police, the NRMA, and Rockdale
  Council all evinced little enthusiasm for the
  building of the link now contemplated.

• Indeed the DMR said this in its submission:-

“The Department’s current
investigations show that
traffic may not be distributed
adequately to available routes
to the north and east of the
airport.”

• The Report identifies certain environmental
  problems occasioned by the construction of that
  link. There would be severence of a community
  between Cooks River and Tancred Avenue, Kyeemagh,
  consisting of 91 houses. (Report Volume IV, page
  295)

• Quite apart from these problems, the building of
  such a link would generate its own problems.
  The Joint DMR/PEC Study Report identified certain
  'critical locations’ which were perennially
  congested. The following were named:-

o   Marsh Street, Arncliffe

o   Wickham Street, Arncliffe

o   The junction of Forest Road and
Princes Highway

o   Forest Road, especially at the
Bexley Shopping Centre

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o   The junction of Forest Road and
Stoney Creek Road

• These are precisely the areas into which traffic
  would be channelled when using the proposed link
  between Marsh Street and Tancred Avenue, Kyeemagh.

• The creation of such a link seems to proceed on
  the assumption that the worst area is Brighton
  or the Rockdale Shopping Centre. That assumption
  is not borne out by the evidence presented to me.
  Rockdale, like many inner city suburbs, has a great
  many traffic problems. However, Forest Road and
  especially the Bexley Shopping Centre are the worst
  effected (see Volume IV page 82). The Bexley
  Shopping Centre is specifically dealt with in the
  Container Report, page 91 and in the Final Volume
  of the Report (Volume IV, pages 186-187 etc). The
  measured noise level in the Bexley Shopping Centre
  is 83 decibels. At 70 decibels it is difficult
  to conduct telephone conversations. A difference
  of 10 decibels is an effective doubling of the
  noise level.

• There is ample corroboration for each one on these
  statements in the material submitted to the Inquiry
  by the DMR itself. Critical intersections for
  instance were identified in Figure 14 (Volume IV)
  and included each of the intersections named.
  Forest Road and The Bexley Shopping Centre were
  identified as being amongst the worst afflicted
  areas.

6. EVASION OF THE SCHEME

1. There are certain features of containerisation which
reduce the likelihood of evasion. (See Report pages
257-254). The features include:-

• The container terminals deal with the
  shipping fines and not with the importer
  or exporter. The shipping lines will convey
  information to the terminal as to the where-
  abouts of the importer or exporter.

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• Approximately 80% of the shipping liners
  trade will come through familiar clients.
  They are clients with whom they have an
  established relationship. They know
  precisely where they are located.
  Accordingly they know where the containers
  are coming from (in the case of exports)
  or where they are going to (with imports).

In short, in approximately 80% of cases the scheme will
be self enforcing. A company which is located in the
Western Zone would hardly represent to a shipping line
(which was familiar with the facts) that it was located
somewhere in the Eastern Zone. The shipping line would
immediately know that information was false. It would
have to make itself party to a conspiracy to defeat the
scheme, by conveying that information to the terminal,
before the container could be sent to the Eastern Zone.
This is unlikely, especially if there are other
disincentives operating.

2. It is, however, still necessary to deal with the
possibility of evasion because in some cases (perhaps 20%)
a shipping line may unwittingly convey a false
representation made by an importer or exporter. In
practical terms, the likelihood of evasion will be further
reduced by the following:-

• The cost penalty involved in the scheme
  is only $20. Even that may disappear if
  the shipping lines decide to absorb the
  cost of the scheme, and pass it on by
  averaging that cost over the entire
  Sydney trade. (See Report pages 170-172).

• Importers and exporters should be
  required to make a declaration as to the
  origin/destination of their containers.
  It should not be necessary to make a
  declaration for each container. One

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declaration for its entire trade, lodged
with a designated officer, would be
sufficient. That would give some guarantee
of the authenticity of the information
conveyed. (See Report page 258). An importer
or exporter would be guilty of a criminal
offence, namely making a false declaration,
if in fact the destination or origin were
incorrectly specified.

• There should be spot checks from time to time,
  principally at the terminal (in the case of
  export containers) or at the importer’s premises
  (in the case of import containers).

3. I should emphasise that the provision suggested to
cope with the possibility of evasion are not aimed at
truck drivers. They are aimed at the importers or
exporters. The truck driver should be deemed the agent
of the importer or exporter, in the same way that the
importer or exporter is responsible for the actions of
a customs agent under the Customs legislation.

4. It is not anticipated, therefore, that the scheme
would involve an elaborate policing procedure. Truck
drivers, in the course of their trade, have to suffer
far more onerous and far more elaborate policing
procedures than the schemes will require.

 

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